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Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of the interest rate setting be-
havior of the four largest banks in the Dutch mortgage market, using advertised
interest rates at a daily frequency. The evidence for the long run pricing behaviour
suggests that the banks operate in a competitive environment as they base their
interest rates on funding cost. However, two banks appear to be less cost sensitive
than the others. In the short run, most of the banks adjust their rates less strongly to
funding cost increases than to decreases, which suggests competitive pressures. For
one bank significant evidence is found for a quicker response to negative than to
positive deviations of actual from desired interest rates.
Keywords Asymmetric pricing · Mortgage loans · Error Correction Model
JEL Classification G21 · L13
1 Introduction
The merger wave in European banking during the last two decades has led to some
concerns regarding the degree of banking competition. Especially in markets where
entry is potentially blocked, due to either legal or economic entry barriers (e.g. high
entry costs), competition authorities may face problems in guarding market perfor-
mance and consumer interests. From an authorities’ point-of-view it is essential to
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have insight into the degree of monopoly power in banking markets after this wave
of consolidation. A few empirical studies compare banking competition in European
countries. For instance Gual and Neven (1993) compare banking costs for consumers
across countries. Mojon (2001) observes that the pass-through of monetary policy
interest rate changes into money market rates varies across European countries.
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) report differences in retail interest rates across EU
countries. Bikker and Haaf (2002) measure banking competition in 23 countries and
find that competition is weaker in local and more concentrated markets.
The Dutch banking sector in particular faces concerns regarding financial com-
petition, as is apparent in the initiative of the Dutch competition authority (NMa)
to publish a Monitor of the Financial Industry (NMa 2003). In the Netherlands,
four large banks (ABN-Amro, Rabobank, Fortis, and ING) together account for
about 80% of the market for banking services.1 In the literature there is some
evidence of imperfect competition in the Dutch banking markets. Gual and Neven
(1993) find that Dutch consumers face higher banking costs than Belgian, French,
and German consumers. As the provision of mortgages in the Netherlands is to a
large extent still a local (or regional) activity the concerns with respect to the degree
of competition apply specifically to this type of the banking market. Degryse and
Ongena (2005) show that geographical distance is an important element in the bank-
client relation, which might typically apply to mortgage borrowing. Contrary to this
argument one could say that all four banks have a national coverage and so compete
in all local communities (as opposed to e.g. Germany). Mojon (2001) argues that
the pass-through of official interest rate changes into bank mortgage rates in the
Netherlands is about half of the Euro-zone average. This could be caused by the
fact that Dutch mortgage contracts have a rather long maturity compared to other
European countries. Toolsema and Jacobs (2007), using monthly data on the macro
level for the Dutch mortgage market, conclude that there is asymmetric pass-through
of funding costs into mortgage interest rates in the sense that Dutch banks tend to
increase interest rates instantly when costs rise, while waiting to lower the rates when
costs drop. This might lead to serious issues in competition in the banking sector and
be of some concern to the supervisor/central bank in the light of transmission of
monetary policy.
The contribution of this paper is that the interest rate setting behavior in the
Dutch mortgage market is analyzed using daily data on individual banks.2 Unlike
Toolsema and Jacobs (2007), who use macro data on a monthly basis, this study uses
individual bank data with a daily frequency. The setup is as follows. First, the pass-
through of funding cost into mortgage rates is tested. The hypothesis tested is that a
dominant market player is less cost sensitive and more able to shield profit margins.
Next, asymmetric price setting behaviour is tested. The prior tested is that a dominant
market player adjusts prices more quickly upwards than downwards.
The data used are daily data on interest rates set by the four largest Dutch banks
from October 1997 through July 2003 for mortgage loans with a maturity of 30 years.
1ABN-Amro and Fortis have merged on 1 July 2010, after our sample period has ended.
2The focus is on interest rate setting and not on the quantities of mortgage loans supplied, because
banks are likely to participate in a game of Bertrand price competition instead of Cournot quantity
oligopoly (see also Freixas and Rochet 1997).
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The interest rate series are for two types of contracts: a contract for which the interest
rate renewal period is 5 years and a contract for which this period is 10 years. The
interest rates used are the advertised rates, not the effective rates. Although most of
these data is public, some banks provided the time-series under the restriction that
the name of the bank would be kept anonymous. Therefore the four Dutch banks
concerned are hereafter labelled randomly Bank A, B, C and D, respectively.
The results of the analysis indicate that the banks base their interest rates on
funding cost. Two banks appear to be less cost sensitive than the others. In the short
run, most of the banks adjust their rates less strongly to funding cost increases than to
decreases, which suggests competitive pressures. For one bank significant evidence
is found for a quicker response to negative than to positive deviations of actual from
desired interest rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 gives a short
description of the Dutch mortgage market. Section 3 reviews some of the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on interest rate pass-through and asymmetric pricing.
The econometric methodology is explained in Section 4, the results of which are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Dutch market for mortgage loans
2.1 The market
In 2000, the provision of mortgage loans by banks in the Dutch mortgage mar-
ket accounted for roughly 45–50% of the total market volume (Hassink and van
Leuvenstein 2003). The market share of commercial banks in outstanding loans is
much larger. In 2002, the total size of outstanding mortgage loans in the Netherlands
was about 350 billion euros. Banks supplied 278 billion euros, institutional investors
about 44 billion euros while the remaining 28 billion euros was supplied by others,
e.g., foreign financial institutions.
The four largest banks had a total market share of the bank-mortgage market of
about 83% on average over the sample period 1997–2003 (authors’ calculations). The
NMa (2003) reports that in 2000 ABN-Amro had a market share of 20%, Rabobank
of 22%, Fortis 12%, and ING Group 25%.
Various types of mortgage loans are available in the Netherlands, ranging from
simple annuity loans to security-financed products. Most contracts run for 30 years,
with interest renewal negotiations mostly after 1, 2, 5 or 10 years (but also 15, 20
and even 30 years). About half a million new contracts were written in 2002. Two
thirds were meant to finance a new house, while one-third was a second mortgage.
This paper focuses on the most popular interest rate renewal contracts for 30 year
mortgage loans: renewal after 5 and 10 years, respectively. In the remainder of this
paper these products are referred to as 5- and 10-year contracts.
2.2 Price-setting behavior by banks
The price setting behavior of the four largest banks is tracked over the years 1997–
2003 using daily observations. The data is presented in two ways. First, Table 1 gives
the dates of the changes of the interest rates on 5-year contracts. The dating clearly
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Table 1 Dates of interest rate
changes for 5-year contracts
Year Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
1998 13-Jan-98 13-Jan-98 13-Jan-98 13-Jan-98
16-Jan-98
20-Feb-98 19-Feb-98 23-Feb-98 24-Feb-98
25-Jun-98




1999 15-Jan-99 14-Jan-99 20-Jan-99
14-Apr-99 20-Apr-99 16-Apr-99
12-May-99
9-Jun-99 14-Jun-99 11-Jun-99 11-Jun-99
7-Jul-99 9-Jul-99 6-Jul-99 6-Jul-99
4-Aug-99 7-Aug-99 6-Aug-99 6-Aug-99
14-Oct-99 15-Oct-99 13-Oct-99 19-Oct-99












10-Aug-01 15-Aug-01 20-Aug-01 17-Aug-01
28-Sep-01 28-Sep-01 2-Oct-01
24-Oct-01 2-Nov-01
7-Nov-01 8-Nov-01 6-Nov-01 13-Nov-01
26-Nov-01
12-Dec-01 14-Dec-01 19-Dec-01
2002 18-Feb-02 15-Feb-02 12-Feb-02 11-Jan-02
13-Mar-02 11-Mar-02
26-Mar-02 8-Apr-02 25-Mar-02 28-Mar-02
19-Jun-02 8-Jul-02 28-Jun-02 5-Jul-02




2003 15-Jan-03 16-Jan-03 22-Jan-03 21-Jan-03
12-Feb-03 24-Feb-03
17-Mar-03 13-Mar-03 3-Mar-03 3-Mar-03
26-Mar-03 28-Mar-03 26-Mar-03
shows clustering. The table does not show the magnitude of the changes. Therefore,
Fig. 1 presents the time-series of the interest rates set by the four banks together with
the capital market funding rate (the interest rate on 5-year government securities).
This figure tells the same story as Table 1.













Fig. 1 Interest rates on 5-year mortgage contracts (bank A to D) and the market rate. Note: M5
denotes interest rate on government securities with a maturity of 5 years
For 10-year contracts the table and figure look quite similar (and therefore are not
reported here). In the analysis hereafter, the results are reported for both products.3
As the interest rate margin plays a role in the model to be defined in Section 4,
Table 2 gives the mean interest rate margins on the two types of contracts. r ji is
the interest rate on a j = (5, 10)-year mortgage contract set by bank i = A, B, C, D.
r jM,t is the market funding rate with a maturity j at time t. So the margin is r
j
i − r jM.
Table 2 shows that the interest rate margins differ between banks.4 Bank D has the
lowest interest margin on both 5 and 10 year contracts. Below a linear model is used
to describe the long-run cost sensitivity of mortgage rates and the implied interest
rate margin. Basically, the bank’s mortgage interest rate is modelled as depending
on the capital market rate (representing funding cost) plus an intercept, while taking
short-run dynamics into account.
3It should be noted that a precise comparison between the rates offered by the individual banks can
be troubled by the diversity of the products involved.
4These differences may reflect relative market power or simply differences in products (note that the
latter could also be considered as elements of market power), or even cross-subsidization.
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Table 2 Mean interest rate margins (percentage-points). Sample period: 28 October 1997—21 July
2003. Number of observations: 2,025
5-year rates Margin 10-year rates Margin
r5A − r5M 0.808 r10A − r10M 0.748
r5B − r5M 1.066 r10B − r10M 1.000
r5C − r5M 1.118 r10C − r10M 1.138
r5D − r5M 0.583 r10D − r10M 0.496
3 Literature review
The introduction reviewed some studies on competition in the mortgage market.
In this section the focus is on models of (asymmetric) price adjustment. Several
theories of asymmetric price adjustments are presented in the literature. Focusing
on the relevant ones for the banking sector, the first reason for asymmetric price
adjustment is that if concentration in a market is high, due to e.g. entry barriers,
there is a scope for price coordination. Tacit collusion can occur with full or partial
information on the input prices of all the players in the market. A second cause of
asymmetric pricing may be the existence of consumer search costs. If searching for a
lower price is costly, firms can exploit this. Also, if consumers face a signal extraction
problem and output prices are volatile, the expected gains from searching by the
consumer are low. Third, price adjustment cost, so-called menu costs, may cause
price adjustment asymmetries. Finally, banks incur a so-called offer cost. Clients that
have received a mortgage contract offer from a bank still benefit from a subsequent
interest rate decrease within the contract offer period, while not being confronted
with any interest rate increases. Banks have to bear the costs unilaterally, which
creates an asymmetry in pricing (see Toolsema 2003).
There is an extensive empirical literature on asymmetric price responses to cost
shocks in the banking sector. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) present evidence for con-
sumer deposit markets and link their empirical evidence of asymmetric pricing to
market concentration. Allen et al. (1999), Haney (1988), Hofmann and Mizen (2004)
and Toolsema and Jacobs (2007) find evidence of asymmetric pricing in the mortgage
market.
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) analyse the UK banking market using data on
90-day deposits and mortgages for seven banks. They report incomplete pass-through
for rates on thirteen deposit and mortgage products offered by individual UK
financial institutions. The speed of adjustment in retail rates depends on whether the
perceived gap between retail and base rates is widening or narrowing. The pattern
of responses supports the theory that financial institutions respond more to widening
gaps than to narrowing gaps.
Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) present microeconomic evidence of an electronic
market for mortgage loans for the US. They find that prices are much less sticky in
electronic markets as compared to traditional retail outlets. But even in electronic
markets cost increases are passed on to consumers about twice as quickly as cost
decreases.
The study by Toolsema and Jacobs (2007) is highly relevant to the present one
since it analyzes the case of the Dutch mortgage market. Using a macro-aggregate
measure of the Dutch mortgage rate, they find downward rigidity of the mortgage
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interest rate. They conclude that the interest rate offer set by banks on new loans is
rigid downwards. The contribution of the present paper is the use of Dutch mortgage
market data with a daily frequency and for individual banks. Micro-data evidence for
the Dutch mortgage market is still lacking as far as we know. These data are available
for the UK markets; recent work in this field is done by Fuertes and Heffernan (2009)
and Fuertes et al. (2010). Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) test for heterogeneities
in the interest rate transmission mechanism, using a large sample of 662 monthly
retail rates on seven deposit and loan products for the UK banking market. The
evidence reported indicates between-product heterogeneity but notable differences
were found between financial firms in the way they adjust their rates. Heterogeneity
in adjustment is found to be linked to menu costs and key financial ratios. The
adjustment speed of savings rates is significantly faster than that of mortgage rates:
this is consistent with the general view that the downward adjustment of retail rates
is faster for savings than mortgages. Fuertes et al. (2010) explore the interest rate
transmission mechanism using a broad disaggregated sample of UK deposit and
credit products for the period 1993–2005. The dataset consists of 662 disaggregated,
bank-specific monthly rates on savings and current accounts, unsecured personal
loans, mortgages, credit cards and store cards. They find a faster adjustment toward
the long run path when the policy rate revision widens the gap. Large gaps lead to a
disproportionately faster correction, mainly for deposits. The magnitude of the policy
rate change also impacts the adjustment speed. The heterogeneity across finan-
cial institutions and products is explained to some extent by diversification, profit
volatility, product range, market concentration and the existence of menu costs.
Market concentration and profit volatility emerge as significant determinants of
nonlinear adjustment.
The literature shows that the issue of pass-through and asymmetric adjustment
is alive and relevant. The impact of monetary policy via changes in policy rates
is fully dependent on the interest rate adjustment behavior of private banks. The
recent evidence for the UK illustrates that asymmetric adjustment is found and that
there might be a link with bank concentration or imperfect competition. However,
apart from the study by Toolsema and Jacobs (2007), which uses aggregate data on
a monthly basis, little is known about the Dutch mortgage market. Our contribution
is the first to focus on daily interest rate adjustment using micro-evidence for the
Dutch market.
4 Econometric methodology
Prior to estimating the models, the time series properties of the interest rates used
are tested. Special attention should thereby not only go to testing stationarity but
also to the presence of clustered volatility, which is a common characteristic of high-
frequency data such as used in this paper. The results of this pretesting information
are then used for estimating the model. The model assumes that, in the long run,
banks set mortgage rates as a mark-up on funding costs (Toolsema and Jacobs 2007):
r ji,t = α ji + β ji r jM,t +  ji,t (1)
where r ji,t is the interest rate on a j = (5, 10)-year mortgage contract set by bank
i = A, B, C, D at time t, r jM,t is the market funding rate with a maturity j at time t,
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and α ji , β
j
i are bank-specific and contract-maturity specific mark-up and pass-
through parameters, respectively.  ji,t is a residual, which may contain ARCH-effects
as a result of the daily frequency of the data. Therefore the long-run parameters
are estimated correcting for possible ARCH-effects. Next, an Error Correction
Model (ECM) is specified to capture both the short-run and long-run dynamics.
Following Geweke (2004), two types of asymmetric price adjustment in the short
run are allowed for. Suppose the short-run dynamics including asymmetries in first














M,t−s + ω j,+i ˆ j,+i,t−1 + ω j,−i ˆ j,−i,t−1 + u ji,t (2)
where the error correction parameters ω+i , ω
−
i < 0, ˆ are the residuals from Eq. 1
and λ+i,s, λ
−
i,s are the (positive) parameters of adjustment to capital market interest
rate changes. The superscripts + and − refer to the positive part and negative part
of the time series, respectively. For example, for rM,t:
r+M,t =
{
rM,t if rM,t > 0




{ 0 if rM,t > 0
rM,t if rM,t < 0
(4)
The first two sets of terms in Eq. 2 are current and lagged capital market interest
rate increases and decreases, respectively. Since daily observations with irregular,
infrequent and discrete jumps are used (see Fig. 1), the short-run parameters cannot
be estimated independently. Therefore, the Moving Average (MA) operator is used:





The intuition is that the variance of the short-run changes in the market rates





) = λ j,+i MA
(
r j,+M,t−s, T
) + λ j,−i MA
(
r j,−M,t−s, T
) + ω j,+i ˆ j,+i,t−1 + ω j,−i ˆ j,−i,t−1 + u ji,t
(6)
Two forms of asymmetric adjustment are considered. First, it is possible that there is
asymmetric adjustment to the capital market interest rate changes, so-called amount
asymmetry in the short run. There is short-run amount asymmetry if λ+i = λ−i .
Secondly, the adjustment process toward the long run can be asymmetrical. This
so-called adjustment asymmetry is present if ω+i = ω−i .5 The relevance of these
asymmetries for competition is that the amount and adjustment asymmetries will be
5In theory, the effects of shocks to volatility can be asymmetric as well (see Bettendorf et al. 2009).
One can for instance assume that the residuals in the short-run specification follow an EGARCH-
process. Since our dependent variables do not demonstrate ARCH-effects (according to the tests for
ARCH-presence in the ECMs), we refrain from the latter type of asymmetry.
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more relevant for the market leader than for the Stackelberg followers. A dominant
bank is expected to be able to maintain its mark-up longer than its rivals. This would
imply that dominant market participants pass through market interest rate increases
more quickly than market interest rate decreases (λ+ > λ−) and that a positive gap
between the model-based and actual interest rate in the previous period (leading to
a negative estimated residual) leads to a swifter error correction than a negative gap
(|ω−| > |ω+|).
5 Results
5.1 Stationarity and clustered volatility of the series
First, the interest rate time series are tested for stationarity. Since the bank interest
rates are constant in short intervals with discrete jumps (see Fig. 1), the process is
not typically standard. Table 3 presents results of Augmented–Dickey–Fuller and
Phillips–Perron tests for stationarity for the 5-year capital market interest rate (r5M)
and the interest rate on 5-year mortgage contracts of Bank A. Both series are of
order I(1) and the other interest rates exhibit the same property. Next, cointegration
between bank A’s mortgage interest rate and the capital market rate is tested. Table 4
shows that there indeed is cointegration. Similar results apply to the interest rates of
Bank B, C and D (therefore not reported here).
The mortgage interest rates set by banks do not demonstrate clustered volatility
(by definition). However, the two market interest rates might show clustered volatil-




j = 5, 10. A positive and slowly decaying autocorrelation function could establish
clustered volatility. However, this is not found for both capital market interest rates.
By way of precaution the residuals of both long-run and short-run models will be
tested for ARCH-effects, though.









Exogenous None None None None
Lag length (SIC) 0 0 0 0
ADF test statistic −1.094 −47.169 −1.428 −45.717
Critical values 5% level −1.941 −1.941 −1.941 −1.941
p-value* 0.249 0.000 0.143 0.000
Observations 2091 2090 2092 2091
Null of unit root Not rejected Rejected Not rejected Rejected
Phillips–Perron test
Exogenous None None None None
Bandwidth 6 4 1 0
P-P test statistic −1.095 −47.145 −1.429 −45.717
Critical values 5% level −1.941 −1.941 −1.941 −1.941
p-value* 0.248 0.000 0.143 0.000
Observations 2091 2090 2092 2091
Null of unit root Not rejected Rejected Not rejected Rejected
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p -values
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Trend assumption No deterministic trend
Lags 2
Observations 2089
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical value p-value**
None* 0.042 91.107 25.872 0.000
At most 1 0.001 1.835 12.518 0.978
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (maximum eigenvalue)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-eigen statistic 5% critical value p-value**
None* 0.042 89.272 19.387 0.000
At most 1 0.001 1.835 12.528 0.978
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values
5.2 Pass-through of costs in the long run
The long-run parameters α j and β j are estimated for each bank using a pairwise
ARCH(1) model of r ji on r
j
M (see Eq. 1). First, the long-run model is estimated by
OLS. Table 6 shows that there is incomplete pass-through and a significant mark-up
for 5-year contract pricing by bank A (note that β j differs significantly from unity).
The reported ARCH-LM test indicates that there are ARCH-effects present in
the residuals. Therefore, the model is reestimated using an ARCH(1)-specification.
Table 7 illustrates that the magnitude of the parameters is not significantly affected
by the ARCH-correction (as compared to the OLS-results). Table 8 presents con-
densed information on the results for the four banks and the two contracts, in
line with Table 7. It gives the parameter estimates of all the cointegrating vectors,
corrected for ARCH. From this table the following conclusions can be derived:
1. The four Dutch banks set their prices competitively, as β j is significantly positive;
2. Banks A and D typically follow the market rate less closely than banks B and C
(as shown by the lower estimates of β j);
Table 5 Autocorrelations of first differences and squared first differences of r5M and r
10
M. Two








1 −0.031 0.117 −0.039 0.135
2 0.044 −0.005 0.035 −0.001
3 −0.007 0.007 −0.023 0.002
4 0.008 0.004 −0.007 0.021
5 −0.029 −0.007 −0.032 −0.008
6 0.016 0.054 0.011 0.071
7 −0.023 0.115 −0.034 0.097
8 0.026 0.068 0.025 0.070
9 −0.001 0.020 −0.007 −0.001
10 −0.012 0.016 0.025 0.028
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S.E. of regression 0.213
F-statistic (p-value) 12120.6 (0.000)
Durbin–Watson 0.042
ARCH-LM-test (p-value) 7493.98 (0.000)
Wald test F-statistic (p-value)
H0 : β5A = 1 (df = 2090) 1627.55 (0.000)
H0 : α5A = 0, β5A = 1 (df = 2090) 15.945 (0.000)
3. Bank B has β-parameters closer to unity and thus follows the market most
closely;
4. The mark-up parameter α is highest for Bank A and Bank C. However, since it
may concern heterogeneous products in terms of non-interest rate conditions in
the contracts, the estimated mark-ups do probably not allow inference concern-
ing market power.
It follows from the long-run analysis that Bank A and Bank D seem to set interest
rates more independently of market developments than Bank B and Bank C. This
should be kept in mind for the analysis of short-run asymmetric price adjustment.
The estimated residuals from the long-run models will be used in the corresponding
short-run ECM-models hereafter.
5.3 Asymmetric pass-through
The next step is to estimate the short-run Error Correction Model (6) for the 5- and
10-year contracts and the four banks. The differences between the λi-parameters
in model (6) indicate amount asymmetry, while the differences between the ωi-
parameters denote adjustment asymmetry. In line with Toolsema and Jacobs (2007),
our priors are that λ+ > λ− and |ω−| > |ω+|. There is an arbitrary choice of the
number of lags T to be used in the moving average term. We experiment with 15 days
Table 7 Long-run
ARCH(1) results





S.E. of regression 0.214
F-statistic (p-value) 4024.28 (0.000)
Durbin–Watson 0.042
ARCH-LM-test (p-value) 0.138 (0.968)
Wald test F-statistic (p-value)
H0 : β5A = 1 (df = 2085) 44630.59 (0.000)
H0 : α5A = 0, β5A = 1 (df = 2085) 453878.0 (0.000)
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Table 8 Long-run ARCH(1)
parameters
5-year α5 β5 10-year α10 β10
r5A 2.104 0.723 r
10
A 2.315 0.682
r5B 1.744 0.829 r
10
B 1.945 0.818
r5C 2.223 0.758 r
10
C 2.538 0.738
r5D 1.939 0.710 r
10
D 1.717 0.760
and 30 days, respectively. The variance of the moving average of the market interest
rate changes decreases in lag length. Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 give the estimation results
for the four banks for the 5- and 10-year contracts, both for the 15- and 30-day moving
average transformation of the amount terms. Hence, there are 16 estimated models
in total.
In general, the Error Correction Model fits the data reasonably well. The esti-
mated λ’s are positive while the ω’s are negative, in line with the assumptions. Most
of them are statistically significant, the ω’s more so than the λ’s.
The Wald tests merit particular attention as measures of amount and adjustment
asymmetry. The evidence is weak. Employing generous significance levels up to
10%, only five out of the 16 estimated models show evidence of amount asymmetry
(λ+ = λ−). Four of these cases concern Bank A and Bank D (both for 5-year
contracts), the fifth case refers to Bank B (10-year contract, T = 15). However,
contrary to expectations, in all of these cases banks respond more strongly to
decreases in market interest rates than to increases (λ+ < λ−). This suggests more
rather than less competition.
Table 9 Error Correction Model estimation results for 5-year contracts (T = 15)
(r5i,t) = λ5,+i MA(r5,+M,t−s, 15) + λ5,−i MA(r5,−M,t−s, 15) + ω5,+i RES5,+i,t−1 + ω−i RES5,−i,t−1 + i,t
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
λ
5,+
i 0.179 0.094 0.117 0.057
σ(λ
5,+
i ) (0.090) (0.122) (0.109) (0.106)
λ
5,−
i 0.324 0.230 0.177 0.261
σ(λ
5,−
i ) (0.090) (0.123) (0.103) (0.096)
ω
5,+
i −0.010 −0.015 −0.022 −0.010
σ(ω
5,+
i ) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
ω
5,−
i −0.023 −0.022 −0.022 −0.026
σ(ω
5,−
i ) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 2077 2077 2077 2010
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.022 0.031 0.026
S.E. of Regression 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.035
Durbin–Watson 2.016 2.010 2.020 2.016
ARCH LM-test 0.274 0.226 0.204 0.167
(p-value) (0.601) (0.635) (0.652) (0.683)
Wald test: F-statistic
H0 : λ5,+i = λ5,−i v H1 : λ5,+i = λ5,−i 2.860 2.442 0.397 4.892
(p-value) (0.091) (0.118) (0.528) (0.027)
H0 : ω5,+i = ω5,−i v H1 : ω5,+i = ω5,−i 1.524 0.505 0.027 2.993
(p-value) (0.217) (0.478) (0.869) (0.084)
J Financ Serv Res (2011) 39:145–159 157
Table 10 Error Correction Model estimation results for 5-year contracts (T = 30)
(r5i,t) = λ5,+i MA(r5,+M,t−s, 30) + λ5,−i MA(r5,−M,t−s, 30) + ω5,+i RES5,+i,t−1 + ω−i RES5,−i,t−1 + i,t
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
λ
5,+
i 0.411 0.249 0.204 0.201
σ(λ
5,+
i ) (0.114) (0.122) (0.149) (0.146)
λ
5,−
i 0.562 0.355 0.259 0.367
σ(λ
5,−
i ) (0.112) (0.123) (0.149) (0.135)
ω
5,+
i −0.007 −0.014 −0.021 −0.023
σ(ω
5,+
i ) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
ω
5,−
i −0.023 −0.019 −0.022 −0.023
σ(ω
5,−
i ) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 2062 2062 2062 1995
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.023 0.031 0.026
S.E. of Regression 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.035
Durbin–Watson 2.029 2.017 2.023 2.022
ARCH LM-test 0.262 0.228 0.210 0.168
(p-value) (0.608) (0.633) (0.647) (0.682)
Wald test: F-statistic
H0 : λ5,+i = λ5,−i v H1 : λ5,+i = λ5,−i 2.915 1.409 0.322 3.050
(p-value) (0.088) (0.235) (0.570) (0.081)
H0 : ω5,+i = ω5,−i v H1 : ω5,+i = ω5,−i 2.073 0.263 0.035 1.943
(p-value) (0.150) (0.608) (0.852) (0.163)
Table 11 Error Correction Model estimation results for 10-year contracts (T = 15)
(r10i,t ) = λ10,+i MA(r10,+M,t−s, 15) + λ10,−i MA(r10,−M,t−s, 15) + ω10,+i ˆ10,+i,t−1 + ω10,−i ˆ10,−i,t−1 + ui,t
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
λ
10,+
i 0.200 0.027 0.059 −0.016
σ(λ
10,+
i ) (0.092) (0.090) (0.105) (0.105)
λ
10,−
i 0.269 0.182 0.161 0.108
σ(λ
10,−
i ) (0.090) (0.084) (0.090) (0.100)
ω
10,+
i −0.011 −0.016 −0.036 −0.014
σ(ω
10,+
i ) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
ω
10,−
i −0.026 −0.026 −0.022 −0.030
σ(ω
10,−
i ) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 2077 2077 2077 2010
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.025 0.032 0.022
S.E. of Regression 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.033
Durbin–Watson 2.017 2.009 2.095 2.003
ARCH LM-test 0.073 0.178 0.082 0.035
(p-value) (0.788) (0.674) (0.774) (0.851)
Wald test: F-statistic
H0 : λ10,+i = λ10,−i v H1 : λ10,+i = λ10,−i 0.815 3.832 1.786 2.177
(p-value) (0.367) (0.050) (0.185) (0.140)
H0 : ω10,+i = ω10,−i v H1 : ω10,+i = ω10,−i 2.619 0.981 1.994 3.243
(p-value) (0.141) (0.322) (0.158) (0.072)
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Table 12 Error Correction Model estimation results for 10-year contracts (T = 30)
(r10i,t ) = λ10,+i MA(r10,+M,t−s, 30) + λ10,−i MA(r10,−M,t−s, 30) + ω10,+i ˆ10,+i,t−1 + ω10,−i ˆ10,−i,t−1 + ui,t
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
λ
10,+
i 0.377 0.038 0.118 0.028
σ(λ
10,+
i ) (0.123) (0.128) (0.147) (0.152)
λ
10,−
i 0.420 0.165 0.190 0.121
σ(λ
10,−
i ) (0.124) (0.165) (0.131) (0.147)
ω
10,+
i −0.012 −0.018 −0.039 −0.015
σ(ω
10,+
i ) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
ω
10,−
i −0.024 −0.025 −0.020 −0.028
σ(ω
10,−
i ) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 2062 2062 2062 1995
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.024 0.033 0.022
S.E. of Regression 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.022
Durbin–Watson 2.023 2.007 2.011 2.004
ARCH LM-test 0.072 0.182 0.082 0.036
(p-value) (0.790) (0.670) (0.775) (0.850)
Wald test: F-statistic
H0 : λ10,+i = λ10,−i v H1 : λ10,+i = λ10,−i 0.289 2.408 0.856 1.144
(p-value) (0.591) (0.121) (0.355) (0.285)
H0 : ω10,+i = ω10,−i v H1 : ω10,+i = ω10,−i 1.288 0.376 3.445 2.071
(p-value) (0.256) (0.540) (0.064) (0.150)
Three out of the 16 estimated models show significant evidence of adjustment
asymmetry (ω− = ω+), two of which concern Bank D (T = 15). In accordance with
expectations, Bank D is more eager to adjust its interest rates if the desired level
exceeds the actual rate. The third case of evidence of adjustment asymmetry concerns
Bank C (10-year contract, T = 30), but its adjustment asymmetry is opposite to the
hypothesized one.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the interest rate setting behavior of the
four largest banks in the Dutch mortgage market, using advertised interest rates at
a daily frequency. The evidence for the long run pricing behaviour suggests that
the banks operate in a competitive environment as they base their interest rates on
funding cost. However, two banks appear to be less cost sensitive than the others.
In the short run, most of the banks adjust their rates less strongly to funding cost
increases than to decreases, which suggests competitive pressures. For one bank
significant evidence is found for a quicker response to negative than to positive
deviations of actual from desired interest rates.
From a monetary policy’s perspective heterogeneity in both long-run and short-
run price adjustment to money market rate changes might be troublesome if it leads
to unexpectedly large dispersions in retail mortgage interest rates. The magnitudes
of the differences in the estimated parameters do not suggest such a large dispersion,
though. From a competition authority’s perspective, there is little reason to worry
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about the Dutch mortgage market. In the long run, bank supply of mortgages appears
to be competitive as interest rates are set on the basis of funding costs, although two
banks show lower pass-through rates than the other two. In the short run, most of
the banks adjust their rates less strongly to funding cost increases than to decreases,
which is advantageous to consumers.
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